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Course Outlines

CORPFIN 7024 - Empirical Corporate Finance

North Terrace Campus - Semester 1 - 2025

This course explores advanced theoretical tools and empirical techniques to evaluate contemporary issues in empirical corporate finance research. The course assumes a sound knowledge of the economic theory relating to the foundations of corporate finance. Students are challenged to think critically and broadly across different areas of corporate finance and the literature that bridges corporate finance theory and empirical corporate finance. By the end of the course, students will be familiar with some of the most advanced work in empirical corporate finance, the major empirical approaches utilised, and a solid understanding of what constitutes a strong corporate finance research paper.

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  • General Course Information
    Course Details
    Course Code CORPFIN 7024
    Course Empirical Corporate Finance
    Coordinating Unit Finance and Banking
    Term Semester 1
    Level Postgraduate Coursework
    Location/s North Terrace Campus
    Units 3
    Contact Up to 3 hours per week
    Available for Study Abroad and Exchange Y
    Prerequisites CORPFIN 7005 and (CORPFIN 7033 or CORPFIN 7033MELB) or (CORPFIN 7033AUACM and CORPFIN 7033BUACM)
    Assessment Exam/assignments/tests/presentation as prescribed at first lecture
    Course Staff

    Course Coordinator: Professor Alfred Yawson

    Name:              Alfred Yawson
    Location:          Room 12.42
    Telephone:        8313 0687
    Email:               alfred.yawson@adelaide.edu.au

    Course Timetable

    The full timetable of all activities for this course can be accessed from .

  • Learning Outcomes
    Course Learning Outcomes

    On successful completion of this course, students will achieve the following course learning outcomes (CLOs):


    1. Think critically across different areas of corporate finance and the literature that bridges corporate finance theory and empirical corporate finance (CLO1).

    2. Develop a solid understanding of some of the most advanced work in empirical corporate finance (CLO2).

    3. Acquire advanced knowledge of the major empirical approaches utilized and what constitutes a strong corporate finance research paper (CLO3)

    4. Present and communicate effectively to a knowledgeable audience about current theoretical and empirical research ideas in corporate finance (CLO4).

    University Graduate Attributes

    This course will provide students with an opportunity to develop the Graduate Attribute(s) specified below:

    University Graduate Attribute Course Learning Outcome(s)

    Attribute 1: Deep discipline knowledge and intellectual breadth

    Graduates have comprehensive knowledge and understanding of their subject area, the ability to engage with different traditions of thought, and the ability to apply their knowledge in practice including in multi-disciplinary or multi-professional contexts.

    		 1,2,3

    Attribute 2: Creative and critical thinking, and problem solving

    Graduates are effective problems-solvers, able to apply critical, creative and evidence-based thinking to conceive innovative responses to future challenges.

    		 1,2,3

    Attribute 3: Teamwork and communication skills

    Graduates convey ideas and information effectively to a range of audiences for a variety of purposes and contribute in a positive and collaborative manner to achieving common goals.

    		 4

    Attribute 4: Professionalism and leadership readiness

    Graduates engage in professional behaviour and have the potential to be entrepreneurial and take leadership roles in their chosen occupations or careers and communities.

    		 1,2,3,4
  • Learning Resources
    Required Resources
    Journal articles 
  • Learning & Teaching Activities
    Learning & Teaching Modes
    The course focuses on empirical corporate finance. Lecture topics and basic reading lists are provided below. The teaching and learning approach adopted emphasizes the importance of developing critical thinking and analytical skills. This is achieved through a mix of lectures, class presentations and discussions, quizzes, and a proposal or research paper.
    Workload

    The information below is provided as a guide to assist students in engaging appropriately with the course requirements.

    This is a PhD-level course and therefore you will be expected to treat this course at least as a standard 12 unit university
    course, implying that you are expected to commit to at least 9 hours of private study per week.

    Students in this course are expected to attend all classes.
    Learning Activities Summary
    Lecture topics and basic reading lists are provided below.


    1. Financial Policy: Capital structure

    Readings

    1. Modigliani, Franco, and Merton Miller, 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review 48, 261-297.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1974, On the Irrelevance of Corporate Financial Policy, American Economic Review, 851-865.
    3. Myers, Stewart, 1984, The Capital Structure Puzzle, Journal of Finance 37, 575-592.
    4. Titman, Sheridan, and Roberto Wessels, 1988. The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice, Journal of Finance 1-19.
    5. Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French, 2005. Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock? Journal of Financial Economics 76, 549–582.
    6. Lemmon, Michael, Michael Roberts, and Jaime Zender, 2008. Back to the Beginning: Persistence and the Cross-section of Corporate Capital Structure, Journal of Finance 63, 1575–1608.
    7. DeAngelo, H.,Roll,R., 2015. How Stable are Corporate Capital Structures? Journal of Finance 70, 373–418.
    8. Ralf Elsas, Mark J. Flannery, Jon A. Garfinkel, 2014. Financing Major Investments: Information about Capital Structure Decisions, Review of Finance 18, 1341–1386
    9. Cheol S. Eun, Lingling Wang, 2016. International Sourcing and Capital Structure, Review of Finance 20, 535–574.
    10. Vahap B. Uysal, 2011. Deviation from the target capital structure and acquisition choices. Journal of Financial Economics 102. 602–620.
    11. Harry DeAngeloLinda DeAngeloToni M. Whited 2014. Capital structure dynamics and transitory debt. Journal of Financial Economics 99, 235–26
    12. Klasa, S., Ortiz-Molina, H., Serfling, M., Srinivasan, S., 2018. Protection of trade secrets and capital structure decisions. Journal of Financial Economics 128, 266-286.
    13. DeAngelo, H. 2022. The capital structure puzzle: What are we missing? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 57, 413-454.

    2. Financial Policy: Capital Raising

    Readings

    14. Alexander Ljungqvist, 2006. IPO Underpricing” in B. Espen Eckbo (ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Volume A, (Handbooks in Finance Series, Elsevier/North-Holland), Chapter 7.
    15. Ritter, J.R., 1987. The Costs of Going Public, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 269-282.
    16. Masulis, Ronald W., and Ashok N. Korwar, 1986. Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 91–118.
    17. Mikkelson, Wayne H., and Megan M. Partch, 1986. Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, Journal of Financial Economics 15, 31–60.
    18. Asquith, Paul, and Mullins, 1986. Equity Issues and Offering Dilution. Journal of Financial Economics 15, 61−89.
    19. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. Stulz, R. M. 2010. Seasoned equity offering, market timing, and the corporate lifecycle. Journal of Financial Economics 95, 275-295.
    20. Brugler, J., Comerton-Forde, C., & Hendershott, T. 2020. Does Financial Market Structure Affect the Cost of Raising Capital? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-38.
    21. Adhikari, B., Cicero, D., & Sulaeman, J. 2020. Does Local Capital Supply Matter for Public Firms’ Capital Structures? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-35.
    22. Amy Dittmar, Ran Duchin ,Shuran Zhang, 2020. The timing and consequences of seasoned equity offerings: A regression discontinuity approach. Journal of Financial Economics138, 254-276.
    23. Ann Marie Hibbert, Qiang Kang, Alok,Kumar, Suchi Mishra 2020. Heterogeneous beliefs and return volatility around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 137, 571-589.
    24. Aggarwal, D., Eldar, O. Yael V.Hochberg, Y. V., Litov, L. P. 2022. The rise of dual-class stock IPOs, Journal of Financial Economics 122-153.
    25. Aghamolla, C., Thakor, R. T. IPO peer effects. Journal of Financial Economics, In Press.
    26. Busaba, W. Y., Restrepo, F. The “7% solution” and IPO (under)pricing. Journal of Financial Economics, In Press.

    3. Financial Policy: Dividend Policy

    Readings

    27. Miller, Merton, and Franco Modigliani, 1961, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares, Journal of Business 34, 411-433.
    28. Miller, Merton, and Kevin Rock, 1985, Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information, Journal of Finance 40, 1031-1051.
    29. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Skinner, D.J., 2004. Are dividends disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 425—456.
    30. DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Stulz, R.M., 2006. Dividend policy and the earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory. Journal of Financial Economics 81, 227—254.
    31. Hammed, A., Xie, J. 2019. Preference for dividends and return comovement. Journal of Financial Economics, 132, 103–125.
    32. Grennan, J. 2019 , Dividend payments as a response to peer influence, Journal of Financial Economics 131 549–570.
    33. Ham, C. G,. Zachary R. Kaplan, Z. R. .Leary, M. T. Do dividends convey information about future earnings? Journal of Financial Economics, In press.
    34. David J. Denis, D. J., Osobov, I. 2008. Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy. Journal of Financial Economics 89, 62– 82.
    35. Floyd, E., Nan Li, N., Skinner, D. J. 2015. Payout policy through the financial crisis: The growth of repurchases and the resilience of dividends. Journal of Financial Economics, 118, 299-316.
    36. Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu, 2018. Shareholder Conflicts and Dividends, Review of Finance 22, 1807–1840.
    37. Kale, J., Kini, O., & Payne, J. 2012. The Dividend Initiation Decision of Newly Public Firms: Some Evidence on Signaling with Dividends. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, 365-396.
    38. Kahle, K.M., Stulz, R.M., 2020. Are Corporate Payouts Abnormally High in the 2000s? Journal of Financial Economics 142, 1359-1380.
    39. Michaely, R. Amani, M., 2022. Disappearing and reappearing dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 143, 207-226.

    4. Investment Policy: The Market for Corporate Control

    Readings

    40. Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, 2003, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 70, 295-311.
    41. Masulis, R., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2007. Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns. Journal of Finance, 62: 1851-1889.
    42. Harford, J., Humphery-Jenner, M., Powell, R. G., 2012. The Sources of Value Destruction in Acquisitions by Entrenched Managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 106: 247-261.
    43. Ahern, Kenneth R., 2012. Bargaining Power and Industry Dependence in Mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 103: 530-550.
    44. Golubov, A. Yawson, A. Zhang, H., 2015. Extraordinary Acquirers. Journal of Financial Economics, 116: 314-330.
    45. Albert Sheen. 2014. The Real Product Market Impact of Mergers. The Journal of Finance, 69, 2651 – 2688.
    46. Eckbo, B.E., Makaew, T., Thorburn, K.S., 2018. Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? Journal of Financial Economics 128, 443-465.
    47. Olivier Dessaint, O., Golubov, A., Volpin, P. 2017. Employment protection and takeovers, Journal of Financial Economics 125, 369-388.
    48. Claudio Loderer, URS Waelchli, 2015. Corporate Aging and Takeover Risk, Review of Finance 19, 2277–2315.
    49. Dai, Y., Gryglewicz, S., & Smit, H. 2021. Less Popular but More Effective Toeholds in Corporate Takeovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56, 283-312.
    50. Guernsey, S. Simone M.Sepe, S. M., Serfling, M. 2022. Blood in the water: The value of antitakeover provisions during market shocks, Journal of Financial Economics 143, 1070-1096.
    51. Antón, M., Azar, J., Gine, M., Lin, L., X. 2022. Beyond the target: M&A decisions and rival ownership. Journal of Financial Economics 144, 44-66.

    5. Investment Policy: Divestitures, asset sales & bankruptcies

    Readings

    52. Lang, L., A. Poulsen, and R. Stulz, 1995, Asset selloffs, firm performance, and the agencycosts of managerial discretion,Journal of Financial Economics 37, 3–37.
    53. Kang, J.-K., and A. Shivdasani, 1997, Corporate restructuring during performancedeclines in Japan, Journal of Financial Economics 46, 29–65.
    54. Berger, P. G., Ofek, E. 1999. Causes and Effects of Corporate Refocusing Programs. Review of Financial Studies 12, 311–345.
    55. Çolak, G. Whited, T. M. 2007. Spin-offs, Divestitures, and Conglomerate Investment. Review of Financial Studies 20, Pages 557–595.
    56. Schlingemann, F. P., R. M. Stulz, and R. A. Walkling, 2002, Divestitures and the liquid-ity of the market for corporate assets,Journal of Financial Economics64, 117–144.
    57. Gorbenko, A. S. 2019. How do valuations impact outcomes of asset sales with heterogeneous bidders? Journal of Financial Economics 131, 88–117.
    58. Jain, B. A., Kini, O., Shenoy, J. 2011. Vertical divestitures through equity carve-outs and spin-offs: A product markets perspective. Journal of Financial Economics 100, 594-615.
    59. Gorbenko, A. S. 2019. How do valuations impact outcomes of asset sales with heterogeneous bidders? Journal of Financial Economics 131, 88–117.
    60. Gormley, T., Gupta, N., & Jha, A. 2018. Quiet Life No More? Corporate Bankruptcy and Bank Competition. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(2), 581-611.
    61. Heitz, A., & Narayanamoorthy, G. 2020. Creditor Rights and Bank Loan Losses. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-43.
    62. Lie, E., & Que, T. 2019. Union Concessions following Asset Sales and Takeovers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 54(1), 393-424.
    63. Gantchev, N., Sevilir, M., Shivdasani, A. 2020. Activism and empire building. Journal of Financial Economics 138, 526-548.
    64. Müller, K. 2022. Busy bankruptcy courts and the cost of credit. Journal of Financial Economics 143, 824-845.
    65. Antill, S. Do the right firms survive bankruptcy? Journal of Financial Economics, In Press.

    6. Role of Investment Banking in Corporate Finance

    Readings
    66. Corwin, S. A., Schultz, P., 2005. The role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition. Journal of Finance, 60: 443-486.
    67. Golubov, A., Petmezas, D., Travlos, N. G., 2012. When it Pays to Pay your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As. Journal of Finance, 67: 271-312.
    68. Agrawal, A., Cooper, T., Lian, Q., Wang, Q., 2013. Common Advisers in Mergers and Acquisitions: Determinants and Consequences. Journal of Law and Economics, 56: 691-740.
    69. Sibilkov, Valeriy, McConnell, John J., 2014. Prior Client Performance and the Choice of Investment Bank Advisors in Corporate Acquisitions. Review of Financial Studies, 27: 2475-2503.
    70. Bao, J., Edmans, A., 2011. Do Investment Banks Matter for M&A Returns? Review of Financial Studies, 24: 2286-2315.
    71. Chemmanur, T.J., Ertugrul, M., Krishnan, K., 2019. Is it the investment bank or the investment banker? A study of the role of investment banker human capital in acquisitions. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 54, 587-627.
    72. Nihat Aktas, Audra Boone, Alexander Witkowski, Guosong Xu, Burcin Yurtoglu, 2021. The Role of Internal M&A Teams in Takeovers, Review of Finance 25, 1047–1088.
    73. Yawson, A., Zhang, H. 2021. Central Hub M&A Advisors, Review of Finance 25, 1817–1857.
    74. 2021. Peer selection and valuation in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics.

    7. Corporate Governance – Chief Executive Officers

    Readings

    75. Malmendier, U & Tate, G 2005, 'CEO overconfidence and corporate investment', Journal of Finance, vol.60, no.6, pp. 2661-2700.
    76. Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2009. Superstar CEOs. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124: 1593-1638.
    77. Custódio, C., Metzger, D., 2014. Financial Expert CEOs: CEO脳鲁s work Experience and Firm脳鲁s Financial Policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 114: 125-154.
    78. Custódio, C., Metzger, D., 2013. How do CEOs Matter? The Effect of Industry Expertise on Acquisition Returns. Review of Financial Studies, 26: 2008-2047.
    79. Banerjee, S., Humphery-Jenner, M., Nanda, V., 2015. Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Review of Financial Studies, 28: 2812-2858.
    80. Faleye, O., Kovacs, T., & Venkateswaran, A. (2014). Do Better-Connected CEOs Innovate More? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 49(5-6), 1201-1225.
    81. Hoitash, U., & Mkrtchyan, A. (2018). Recruiting the CEO from the Board: Determinants and Consequences. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(3), 1261-1295.
    82. Morten Bennedsen, Francisco P´erez-gonz´alez,and Daniel Wolfenzon, Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events. Journal of Finance, 75, 1877 – 1911.
    83. Benmelech, E & Frydman, C 2015, 'Military CEOs', Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 117, no.1, pp. 43-59.
    84. Cain, MD & McKeon, SB 2016, 'CEO personal risk-taking and corporate policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 51 no.1, pp. 139-164.
    85. El-Khatib, R, Fogel, K, Jandik, T 2015, 'CEO network centrality and merger performance'. Journal of Financial Economics, vol.116, no.2, pp. 349-382.
    86. Li, M., Lu, Y., & Phillips, G. (2019). CEOs and the Product Market: When Are Powerful CEOs Beneficial? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 54(6), 2295-2326.
    87. Islam E., Jason Zein, J. 2020. Inventor CEO. Journal of Financial Economics 135, 505–527.
    88. Ellis, J., Guo, L., & Mobbs, S. (2020). How Does Forced-CEO-Turnover Experience Affect Directors? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-29.


    8. Corporate Governance – Board of Directors

    Readings

    89. Masulis, R. W., Zhang, E. J., 2019. How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions. Journal of Financial Economics, 132, 226-256.
    90. Adams, R. B., Akyol, A. C., Verwijmeren, P. 2018. Director skill sets, Journal of Financial Economics,130, 641-662.
    91. Reena Aggarwal, R., Dahiya, S. Prabhala, N. R. 2019. The power of shareholder votes: Evidence from uncontested director elections. Journal of Financial Economics,133, 134-153.
    92. Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 1998. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of Management, American Economic Review 88, 96 118.
    93. Adams, R., B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach, 2010. Boards of Directors and their Role in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, Journal of Economic Literature 48, 58-107.
    94. Cai, J. I. E., Garner, J. L., Walkling, R. A., 2009. Electing directors. The Journal of Finance, 64: 2389-2421.
    95. Bouwman, C. H. S., 2011. Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors. Review of Financial Studies, 24: 2358-2394.
    96. Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas, 2008. When are Outside Directors Effective? Journal of Financial Economics 96, 195-214.
    97. Bang Dang Nguyen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, 2010. The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths, Journal of Financial Economics 98, 550-567
    98. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Angie Low, René M. Stulz, 2010. Why do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors? Journal of Financial Economics, 97, 12-32.
    99. Adams, R. B., Akyol, A. C., Verwijmeren, P. 2018. Director skill sets, Journal of Financial Economics,130, 641-662.
    100. Shinwoo Kang, E Han Kim, Yao Lu, 2018. Does Independent Directors’ CEO Experience Matter?, Review of Finance 22, 905–949.
    101. An, H., Chen, C., Wu, Q., & Zhang, T. 2021. Corporate Innovation: Do Diverse Boards Help? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 56, 155-182.

    9. Managerial Incentives - Corporate Decisions & Risk-taking

    Readings

    102. Edmans, A., Gabaix, X., Jenter, D. 2017. Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence. The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance 1, 383-539.
    103. Core, J.E., R.W. Holthausen, and D.F. Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406.
    104. Core, J. E., Guay, W., Larcker D. F. 2008. The power of the pen and executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 1–25
    105. Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J., 1990a. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98, 225 - 264.
    106. K. J. Martijn Cremers, Yaniv Grinstein, 2014. Does the Market for CEO Talent Explain Controversial CEO Pay Practices?, Review of Finance 18, 921–960.
    107. Mike Burkart, Konrad Raff, 2015. Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers, Review of Finance 19, 1383–1414.
    108. Focke, F., Maug, E., Niessen-Ruenzi, A. 2017. The impact of firm prestige on executive compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 123, 313–336.
    109. Correa, R., Lel, U. 2016. Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world. Journal of Financial Economics 122, 500–520.
    110. Gillan,S. L., Hartzell, J. C., Koch, A., Starks, L. T., 2018. Getting the Incentives Right: Backfilling and Biases in Executive Compensation Data. Review of Financial Studies 31, 460–1498.
    111. Cebon, P., Hermalin, B. E., 2015. When Less Is More: The Benefits of Limits on Executive Pay. Review of Financial Studies 28, 1667–1700.
    112. Hoi, C. K., Wu, Q., Zhang, H. 2019. Does social capital mitigate agency problems? Evidence from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 133, 498-519.
    113. Denis, D. K., Jochem, T. Rajamani, A. 2020. Shareholder governance and CEO compensation: The peer effects of Say on Pay. Review of Financial Studies 33, 3130–3173.
    114. ClaireLiu, C., Ronald W.Masulis, R. W., Stanfield, J., 2021. Why CEO option compensation can be a bad option for shareholders: Evidence from major customer relationships. Journal of Financial Economics 142, 453-481.


    10. Methodological Approaches in Corporate Finance

    Readings

    115. Roberts, M. and T. Whited, 2013, Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance, Handbook of the Economics of Finance (PA), 493-572.
    116. Karpoff, J. and M. Wittry, 2018, Institutional & Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Anti-Takeover Laws, Journal of Finance, 73(2), 657-714.
    117. Bertrand, M. and S. Mullainathan, 2003, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, Journal of Political Economy, 111, 1043-1075.
    118. Chaney, T., D. Sraer and D. Thesmar, 2012, The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment, American Economic Review, 102, 2381-2409.
    119. Gormley, T. and D. Matsa, 2014, Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobservable Heterogeneity, Review of Financial Studies, 27(2), 617-661.
    120. Roberts, M. and T. Whited, 2013, Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance, Handbook of the Economics of Finance (PA), 493-572 (sections on Matching and DDR).
    121. Chemmanur, T. and X. Tian, 2018, Do Antitakeover Provisions Spur Corporate Innovation? A Regression Discontinuity Analysis, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(3), 1163-1194.
    122. Bena, J. and T. Xu, 2013, Competition and Ownership Structures of Closely-Held Firms, Review of Financial Studies, 30(5), 1583-1626.
    123. Mitton, T. 2022, Methodological Variation in Empirical Corporate Finance. The Review of Financial Studies 35, 527–575.
  • Assessment

    The University's policy on Assessment for Coursework Programs is based on the following four principles:

    1. Assessment must encourage and reinforce learning.
    2. Assessment must enable robust and fair judgements about student performance.
    3. Assessment practices must be fair and equitable to students and give them the opportunity to demonstrate what they have learned.
    4. Assessment must maintain academic standards.

    Assessment Summary

    The assessment components are as follows:

    Assessment Task Due Date & Time Requirements Weighting % Course Learning Outcomes
    Research questions and answers, novel research ideas and quizzes This is determined in the class You must submit your research question and answer on the topic presented 30% CLO1, CLO2, CLO3, CLO4
    Presentation of the relevant literature This is determined in the class, but usually, you have one to two weeks to prepare Presentation & electronic submission of the PowerPoint slides 30% CLO1, CLO2, CLO3, CLO4
    Research Proposal This will be determined in class Presentation & submission of a research proposal 40% CLO1, CLO2, CLO3, CLO4

    Assessment Detail

    No information currently available.

    Submission

    No information currently available.

    Course Grading

    Grades for your performance in this course will be awarded in accordance with the following scheme:

    M10 (Coursework Mark Scheme)
    Grade Mark Description
    FNS   Fail No Submission
    F 1-49 Fail
    P 50-64 Pass
    C 65-74 Credit
    D 75-84 Distinction
    HD 85-100 High Distinction
    CN   Continuing
    NFE   No Formal Examination
    RP   Result Pending

    Further details of the grades/results can be obtained from Examinations.

    Grade Descriptors are available which provide a general guide to the standard of work that is expected at each grade level. More information at Assessment for Coursework Programs.

    Final results for this course will be made available through .

  • Student Feedback

    The University places a high priority on approaches to learning and teaching that enhance the student experience. Feedback is sought from students in a variety of ways including on-going engagement with staff, the use of online discussion boards and the use of Student Experience of Learning and Teaching (SELT) surveys as well as GOS surveys and Program reviews.

    SELTs are an important source of information to inform individual teaching practice, decisions about teaching duties, and course and program curriculum design. They enable the University to assess how effectively its learning environments and teaching practices facilitate student engagement and learning outcomes. Under the current SELT Policy (http://www.adelaide.edu.au/policies/101/) course SELTs are mandated and must be conducted at the conclusion of each term/semester/trimester for every course offering. Feedback on issues raised through course SELT surveys is made available to enrolled students through various resources (e.g. MyUni). In addition aggregated course SELT data is available.

  • Student Support
  • Policies & Guidelines

    This section contains links to relevant assessment-related policies and guidelines - all university policies.

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    Students are reminded that in order to maintain the academic integrity of all programs and courses, the university has a zero-tolerance approach to students offering money or significant value goods or services to any staff member who is involved in their teaching or assessment. Students offering lecturers or tutors or professional staff anything more than a small token of appreciation is totally unacceptable, in any circumstances. Staff members are obliged to report all such incidents to their supervisor/manager, who will refer them for action under the university's student鈥檚 disciplinary procedures.

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